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“Descriptive” in science is apejorative, almost always pre-
ceded by “merely,” and typically applied
to the array of classical -ologies and 
-omies: anatomy, archaeology, astron-
omy, embryology, morphology, paleon-
tology, taxonomy, botany, cartography,
stratigraphy, and the various disciplines
of zoology, to name a few. But there is
chronic misunderstanding as to what
descriptive science actually is, and thus
there is ignorance of its significance.
This in turn imperils these disciplines
and even the existence of fundamental
knowledge in academia, as recent his-
tory teaches us.
First, an organism, object, or sub-
stance is not described in a vacuum, but
rather in comparison with other organ-
isms, objects, and substances. The com-
parative method assesses variation
among individual things, and organizes
it into systems and classifications that
are used for making predictions. A thing
is relevant in the context of other things:
Tiny Pluto is relevant because it behaves
differently and is shaped differently than
the thousands of other planetary bodies
in the Kuiper Belt. Even the most prosaic
description is actually a highly selective 
account of features that are found to be
significant in comparison with related
things. As a result, there is no such thing
as a perfectly complete description or a
perfectly complete classification or or-
ganization system; as descriptions be-
come more refined and thorough, so do
the systems of organization. The com-
position of our solar system, for exam-
ple, would not have been so controversial
in 2006 were it not for improved obser-
vations and descriptions of Charon
(Pluto’s moon), Ceres and other aster-
oids, and 2003 UB313 (a.k.a. Eris, the 
farthest object in the solar system). What
makes the recent discussion of the solar
system so surprising is that it was based
on something that most people thought
astronomers had already described a
long time ago.
Second, descriptive science is not nec-
essarily low-tech science, and high tech 
is not necessarily better. Genomic se-
quencing and planetary probes (e.g., the
Mars rovers, Spirit and Opportunity) are
tools for descriptive science. They gather
data that will refine, corroborate, and
possibly even revise current descriptions.
The problem is that the high-tech de-
scriptions are seen as more scientific, and
this has repercussions in academia. Ro-
manced by technology and large grant
overheads, academic administrators sup-
plant low-tech with higher-tech descrip-
tive science, even though the new data
may not be much of an improvement. In
these times of megalabs, we need to re-
member that scientific giants of the past
observed and described with quaint tools,
but nevertheless uncovered enduring 
patterns. We still employ, for example,
the basic systems (with numerous re-
finements, of course) that were estab-
lished by Carolus Linnaeus in 1758 for
biological classifications, by William
Smith in 1815 for the geological
timescale, and by Dmitri Mendeleev in
1869 for the periodic table of the 
elements.
More recent architects of scientific
paradigms still include individuals 
working on the technological fringes,
such as the lesser-known researchers
Bruce Heezen and Marie Tharp (she died
this past year). From 1952 to 1977,
Heezen and Tharp methodically charted
the ocean floor with ocean-depth sound-
ings, revealing the midoceanic ridges and
the rift valleys within them. Even though
Alfred Wegener proposed the theory of
continental drift in 1912, it was still
heretical to espouse the theory in the
1950s, despite the voluminous new de-
scriptive evidence that supported it. The
chairman of Heezen and Tharp’s de-
partment at Columbia University was so
enraged that he fired Tharp and virtually
drove Heezen from his lab. So, for the last
decade of the project, Tharp was clois-
tered at home—much like Darwin writ-
ing his Origin—drafting the maps that
changed our view of Earth’s surface and
showing that money doesn’t solve every-
thing. The work of Willi Hennig (1913–
1976) transformed systematics and thus
evolutionary biology. Very few people
know that he wrote his seminal work,
Grundzüge einer Theorie der phylo-
genetischen Systematik, when he was a
prisoner of war in 1945. This and later
phylogenetic treatises built upon his ex-
tensive descriptive work on the mor-
phology, taxonomy, and biogeography
of flies, which he always did alone while
seated at his microscope, constantly 
making notes and sketches, drinking 
coffee, and smoking.
Biology’s equivalent of stellar and
oceanic cartography is taxonomy and
the morphology on which it is based, in-
cluding old-fashioned natural history
observations on behavior, life histories,
and species distributions.Yet, unlike these
analogous fields, taxonomy is derided as
anachronistic, which is ironic given that
taxonomy is still making startling dis-
coveries in a rapidly disappearing natural
world. This is demonstrated by recent
findings such as the discovery several
years ago of a new insect order from
Africa, the Mantophasmatodea, and in
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2006 of a 375-million-year-old verte-
brate from the Arctic, Tiktaalik roseae,
that is a transitional form between lobe-
finned fishes and true tetrapods. The de-
scription of any species is a hypothesis
about the identity of individual organ-
isms, which is testable against further 
evidence such as DNA sequences (and is
usually confirmed). Unfortunately, there
is as much of a crisis for taxonomists as
for what they study. Imagine what could
be accomplished—at a fraction of the
cost of a Mars rover—by a small army of
explorers and taxonomists toiling away to
discover and categorize organisms, like
Tharp working to map the ocean floor.
Finally, a theory is only as good as
what it explains and the evidence (i.e.,
descriptions) that supports it. In biology,
no theory is more profoundly explana-
tory than evolution. Two years ago, the
well-funded efforts to impose intelli-
gent design on K–12 biology curricula
were effectively laid to rest with the court
ruling in Kitzmiller v. Dover (400 F.
Supp.2d 707 [M.D. Pa. 2005]) that 
intelligent design is not scientific, and
teaching it in public schools is there-
fore unconstitutional. But as biologists
rejoice over this victory, we need to 
remember that Darwin was largely a
biologist who was a prolific describer
of everything from barnacles to orchid
pollination and animal emotions. His
Origin of Species succeeded so well 
because it assembled and explained vast
descriptive evidence. Few people are 
as insightful as Darwin, Mendeleev,
Wegener, Hennig, or William Smith, but
we lesser souls can still create enduring
science through work that is gloriously
descriptive, if only academic institu-
tions have the foresight to provide for it.
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